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FOREWORD
Given the unprecedented scale, variation, and
speed involved in the creation, consumption, and distribution of information in the era of big data, the classic challenge of military leadership—that is, making
crucial decisions based on insufficient and likely unreliable information—can become even more daunting.
However, British scholar Keir Giles warns that technological solutions alone are inadequate to equip the commander with the insight necessary for decision-making
in the information and disinformation environments.
As a result, Giles draws from existing leadership
models to illustrate key approaches to leadership,
emotional intelligence competencies, and critical
values that will assist the commander in allowing his
intelligence providers to address most effectively the
uncertainty emerging at the various stages of the intelligence process. Ultimately, these approaches have a
broader utility in consolidating the military commander’s ability to understand multiple perspectives and
adjust their decisions accordingly.
The monograph concludes with a series of policy
recommendations for the U.S. Army on potential
modifications to standard military professional development programs. Such a process should include
exercises and mentorship support aimed at preparing
officers for the leadership styles and values relevant
to today’s challenges at a senior level. The Strategic
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Studies Institute recommends this analysis of the types
of behaviors military commanders must cultivate to
develop ethical leadership in order to confront better
the new information environment.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This monograph considers how a classical challenge that commanders face in war—namely, making
critical decisions on the basis of limited and often
unreliable information—has been exacerbated in the
era of big data. Data overload complicates the intelligence community’s efforts to identify and exclude
disinformation, misinformation, and deception, and
thus hampers its ability to deliver reliable intelligence
to inform decision-makers in a timely manner. The
military commander remains responsible for making
a final decision, yet the great wealth of data now available through the intelligence cycle amplifies the risk
of decision paralysis. With this in mind, technological
solutions tend to be considered the most appropriate
response for managing data overload and disinformation. While these remain relevant, they alone may be
insufficient to equip the military commander with the
necessary insight to guide decisions through the uncertainty of the big data environment. Rather, the military
commander must cultivate a range of new behaviors in
order to avoid decision paralysis and fulfill the distinct
leadership roles a commander must play at the various
stages of the intelligence process.
For this purpose, this monograph combines U.S.
psychologist Daniel Goleman’s theory of leadership
styles; author John Knights’ notion of “transpersonal
leadership,” on how to identify appropriate behaviors that reflect values which are essential to ethical
leadership and ultimately cause positive change in an
organization; and retired U.S. Army General Stanley
McChrystal’s observations from his leadership of the
operations and intelligence (O&I) briefing of a task
force in Iraq. Significantly, all of these models take
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inspiration from timeless classical virtues that prove
essential for command—for example, Thomas Aquinas’s views on justice, temperance, prudence, and
fortitude.
IBM data scientists have summarized the new
big data challenges in four categories—namely, the
volume, variety, veracity, and velocity of how information is produced, consumed, and spread, limiting
our ability to check its reliability. As a result, different leadership approaches, emotional intelligence (EI)
competencies, and critical values will be required at
different stages in the intelligence cycle. Three phases
are included in such a cycle, each of which entails a
specific big data challenge. This monograph proposes
solutions to each of these challenges on the basis of the
three leadership models mentioned earlier.
The first challenge refers to data overload in volume
and variety, primarily affecting the planning and directing phase of the intelligence cycle. Here the military
commander is advised to assume the role of a coach,
empowering subordinates by training them to act with
the command’s perspective. McChrystal’s “thinking
out loud” approach during daily O&I briefings provides an example. The commander would share his
or her thought process with the entire command. In
so doing, the latter may access the commander’s way
of thinking and suggest alternative ways of approaching a situation. The EI competencies required at this
stage are developing others, empathy, and self-awareness. While it has proven to be quite time-consuming,
ultimately, the coaching approach consolidates an
atmosphere of honesty and trustworthiness, thus reinforcing the respect and responsiveness subordinates
develop toward their leaders.
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The second challenge concerns the risk of disinformation in the assessment. At this stage, the military commander should stimulate a team mentality
as the team assesses and questions intelligence analysis. Under these circumstances, by asking questions,
the commander can leverage the expertise in the room
and create a democratic environment in which subordinates are given the opportunity to challenge analyses and identify possible disinformation. Among
key EI competencies, the democratic leadership style
requires transparency to facilitate open discussion and
build trust. Here, the commander must demonstrate
fairness in building team collaboration in order to
avoid turf wars, which would only compartmentalize
information and increase the possibility of disinformation. Hence, the commander must display selfconfidence and inspirational leadership by showing
that all issues raised during the assessment phase are
meant to improve team efforts and not discredit the
intelligence function as a whole. At the same time, the
commander must show humility by admitting that
team efforts can more successfully navigate the disinformation environment. Ultimately, he must encourage team members to promote change and act for the
greater good.
The third challenge relates to the unprecedented
public scrutiny of command decision, resulting from
the nonstop flow of real-time information from the
battlefield to citizens through mass media. Nevertheless, especially in the presence of the uncertainty of the
big data environment, commanders cannot delegate
ultimate authority and must demonstrate visionary
leadership. The latter requires the same EI competencies as democratic leadership—namely, inspirational
leadership, self-confidence, change catalysis, and

xv

transparency. These underpin McChrystal’s description of the heroic leader, one who is self-confident in
one’s capacity to lead despite the complexities of the
modern era. Such capacity entails having the moral
courage and willpower to take ownership of one’s
decisions in the face of uncertainty as well as confidence that the work devoted toward cultivating and
empowering the team will provide the best service to
the country.
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INTRODUCTION
Military commanders have long faced the challenge and responsibility of command decision in the
face of uncertainty. The modern “fog of war,” however, can now be made even denser by “big data” challenges. The sheer volume and variety of information
available clutter the decision-making space to a historically unprecedented degree. The veracity of the
vast amount of information available is questionable,
further complicating command decision. Finally, the
velocity at which information travels compresses decision-making space while leaving those decisions open
to public scrutiny. These multidimensional, big data
challenges increase the risk of decision paralysis in the
face of uncertainty.
Discussions of big data challenges often lead to the
pursuit of technological solutions that will assist the
commander in managing the deluge of information.
Technological solutions alone, however, are inadequate to equip the commander with the insight necessary to navigate today’s complexities. While big
data challenges are creating a new dynamic in the
decision-making space, the military commander must
not lose sight of the enduring values that underpin
sound decisions in the face of uncertainty. The ethics
and character of the military commander have become
even more essential in the information age.
This monograph examines leadership and the military commander’s responsibilities in the new information environment. To do so, it focuses primarily on the
intelligence process as the clearest example of pressure
on decision-making caused by information overload.
The relationship between the military commander and
intelligence has arguably felt the greatest impact of big
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data and its challenges. The intelligence community
(IC) is under immense pressure to find the “needle in
the haystack,” to identify and exclude disinformation,
and to deliver the intelligence to construct an informed
decision promptly. The military commander, in turn,
directs this process, consumes the output, and must
determine the point at which there is enough information to make a decision—a difficult task indeed in the
big data environment.
The monograph uses three studies of leadership
models as prisms through which to examine and
assess the new demands on leadership in the information age. These are:
• Retired U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal’s
observations from his leadership of the operations
and intelligence (O&I) briefing of a task force in
Iraq;
• John Knights’ model of “Transpersonal Leadership,” identifying the values essential to ethical
leadership that must be supported by appropriate
behavior to effect positive change in an organization; and,
• Daniel Goleman’s study of leadership styles and
emotional intelligence (EI) competencies.
A common theme that emerges from these studies
is that timeless classical virtues, such as justice, temperance, prudence, and fortitude, remain essential for
command. How to apply these virtues to modern day
challenges, however, is often far from clear. This monograph will identify the behaviors military commanders
must cultivate to fulfill their roles and responsibilities
successfully as tested in the various steps of the intelligence cycle. This monograph will then draw from these
behaviors to identify the values that, as described by
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Knights, must be brought to a higher consciousness for
ethical leadership in the uncertainty of the information
environment.
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COMMAND DECISION: ETHICAL LEADERSHIP
IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
BIG DATA’S IMPACT ON THE
DECISION-MAKING ENVIRONMENT
Making decisions is of the essence in leadership.1

—General of the Army
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1963

War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog
of greater or lesser uncertainty.2

—Carl von Clausewitz, 1832

These two familiar quotations illustrate a classic
challenge of leadership in war: that of making critically important decisions based upon insufficient and
potentially unreliable information. However, while
some of the challenge itself is timeless, the nature of
the “fog” that contributes to the uncertainty has developed beyond recognition since not only the era of
Clausewitz but also of Eisenhower.
In Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought,
Michael Handel attributes Clausewitz’s noted skepticism of the utility of intelligence in combating this
uncertainty to the reality of the pre-industrial age, in
which the lack of real-time communications meant
information would often expire before it could have an
actionable impact at operational and tactical levels.3 In
the modern age, however, technology to both gather
and speedily deliver immense volumes of information
has improved, beyond all recognition, the capacity of
intelligence to shape and maintain the commander’s
immediate situational awareness. As Handel notes,
“It is the role of intelligence and the ability to obtain
1

reliable information in real time that has changed the
most since the classical works on strategy and war
were written.”4
Despite these advances in real-time communication
technology, uncertainty is a constant that continues to
plague command decision, only in a different form.
While a shortage of actionable information largely
characterized the challenges of the past, commanders
now face a decision-making environment glutted with
unnecessary, non-prioritized information. The popular term for the ever-expanding volume of data that
surrounds us and provides information on everything
and everybody is “big data.”5 IBM data scientists
have categorized the challenges and opportunities of
big data in four distinct dimensions: volume, variety,
veracity, and velocity.6 The following paragraphs will
explore these dimensions and review how they present specific challenges in the military decision-making
environment.
BIG DATA CHALLENGE 1: DATA OVERLOAD
Things really are speeding up. The amount of stored
information grows four times faster than the world
economy, while the processing power of computers grows
nine times faster. Little wonder that people complain of
information overload.7

In Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How
We Live, Work, and Think, authors Viktor MayerSchönberger and Kenneth Cukier add that Google
processes thousands of times more data per day
than the entire collection of U.S. Library of Congress
printed material.8 Given that their study was published in 2013, the continued exponential growth of

2

data availability by the time of this writing will have
added further orders of magnitude to the problem. In
short, the information environment is exploding, rapidly producing volumes of data of all different varieties in all domains, including those that are specifically
of interest to the warfighter.9
Efforts are ongoing to develop new technologies to
harness big data’s analytic potential.10 While technology has succeeded in collecting unprecedented volumes of data, it falls far short in providing solutions
to process all of the data collected. In Intelligence: From
Secrets to Policy, Mark M. Lowenthal describes the IC
big data dilemma as the “Vacuum Cleaner Problem,”
where technical systems pull in a great deal of “chaff”
as well as “wheat,” but budget and resource restrictions currently limit the ability to sift through the
mountain of data to produce actionable intelligence.11
As a result:
A large imbalance exists between the amount of images
or signals that that are collected and that amount that are
processed and exploited (P&E). . . . According to DoD
[the Department of Defense], for example, the National
Security Agency (NSA) records 650 million events daily
(apart from the metadata program), which eventually
culminates in 10,000 reports. Although methodologies are
in place to ensure that the most important intelligence is
processed and exploited, an important image or message
could be overlooked.12

This imbalance is likely to continue in the near
term, and data overload will remain a continuing
challenge for the IC and, through it, the military
commander.
As both government and civilian organizations
tackle the technological difficulties of managing the
P&E of big data, military commanders must meet the
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realities of today’s decision-making environment. Of
primary concern is that data overload can introduce
greater uncertainty into the decision-making process,
risking decision paralysis. While at times it is appropriate to table a decision for additional analysis, it is
the commander’s ultimate responsibility to make the
best, most timely decision with the facts available.13
The vast wealth of data now available to the IC, however, increases the temptation to delay a decision due
to the concern that we can “always know more.”
Decision-makers, for example, are well aware of
the common criticism of the IC’s “failure to connect
the dots” in the events leading up to 9/11.14 The premise of this argument asserts that the IC had access to
the data—the “dots”—and that lack of collaboration
across agencies was the primary failure in identifying
the indications and warnings of impending terrorist
attack. In the era of big data, the “dots” are ever more
plentiful, but decision-makers lack the crucial technological support to ensure that they are connected in a
meaningful manner to protect against future potential
threats to national security.
BIG DATA CHALLENGE 2: DISINFORMATION
As discussed above, current data collection systems pull in a great deal of unwanted, useless chaff as
well as actionable data. To make the decision-making
environment even more difficult, the military commander must also consider the real threat of deliberate
disinformation. Disinformation is by no means a new
challenge to command decision, reflective once more
of Clausewitz’s skepticism of intelligence; he asserts,
“Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory;
even more are false, and most are uncertain.”15 In the
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information age, however, the challenge of disinformation is becoming ever more significant.
A recent but mature example of disinformation in
the decision-making environment is the Russian information campaign relating to eastern Ukraine. A 2015
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence report on Russia’s Information Campaign against Ukraine stated
that deliberate falsification was consistently adopted
as a Russian tactic, suggesting that Russia saw utility
in the method:
Whilst reporting on Ukraine events, journalists of the
Russian state controlled media have methodically
manipulated video and photo materials in order to
produce material visually supporting the prevailing
narrative. This includes the use of photographs from
the Syria, Kosovo and Chechnya wars, as if they had
been taken in East Ukraine, and has proven particularly
effective on social networks.16

Russia’s disinformation strategy capitalized on
the characteristics of big data to its favor. If the media
environment is flooded with false reports, these are
inevitably picked up and repeated by reputable news
outlets unaware, or in some cases even aware, of the
information’s origins.17 Consequently, the false reports
may achieve their objective of crossover from public
opinion space into decision-making space, and thereby
influence the choices made by the adversary—in this
case, the United States.
These challenges of disinformation introduced
into big data thus have serious implications for the
decision-maker. In the case of Russia and Ukraine,
Russian narratives succeeded in the early stages of
conflict, and:
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the fact that the EU [European Union] continued to find
itself unable to refer publicly to the presence of Russian
troops in Ukraine for almost a year denoted a broader
inability to challenge the Russian version of events—
without which a meaningful response was impossible.18

The Russian information campaign’s ability to inhibit
a concerted response is an interesting example of the
challenges a commander may face in making decisions
in a big data disinformation environment. In such an
environment, disinformation may be directed not only
at the commander and his intelligence support but
also at his political leadership and advisers, his home
community, and the civilian population among whom
his command is fighting.
BIG DATA CHALLENGE 3: INCREASED
PUBLIC SCRUTINY
This last point touches on the third key challenge
of big data—namely, that the information environment has dramatically increased the public scrutiny
a commander faces in making a decision. Clausewitz
described the relationship between decision-makers
and the people in his paradoxical trinity:
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its
characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon
its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical
trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and
enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural
force; of the play of chance and probability within which
the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of
subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it
subject to reason alone. The first of these aspects primarily
concerns the people; the second the commander and his
army; the third the government.19
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Public scrutiny, therefore, carries both moral and political considerations that the military commander must
take into account. The information age, however, has
once more altered this dynamic. The flow of real-time
information from the battlefield to citizens through
mass media has greatly increased public scrutiny of
military command decision.20 This phenomenon was
first a significant factor during U.S. involvement in
Vietnam, where near real-time reporting bolstered
anti-war sentiment among some sectors of the U.S.
home population and thereby influenced the duration and outcome of the U.S. commitment. Since that
time, rapid data streams have still further condensed
the interactions of Clausewitz’s trinity, placing greater
strain on the balance between forces. Colonel John
Mark Mattox notes:
the complex interrelationship which Clausewitz describes
has, in fact, assumed heightened significance in the
Information Age—‘heightened,’ because the military and
the government must now take more seriously public
sentiments about war—and especially about the moral
issues of war—than they previously had to do.21

The modern military commander must learn to navigate the public scrutiny of the information age. However, his responsibility to make the best decision under
any given circumstances remains the same, regardless
of who is watching.
These passages have served to demonstrate how
big data has altered the density and consistency of the
fog of war in the modern information age. The natural
instinct is to look to technological solutions to address
the challenges that technology presents, arguing that
the right amount of computing power will reduce the
burden on the human element.22 Technology, however,
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is inadequate to answer all of big data’s challenges. A
commander must also apply specific characteristics
of leadership, sometimes in an innovative manner,
to guide decisions through the uncertainty of the big
data environment. Examining the military commander’s role and responsibility in the intelligence process
provides a means of identifying ethical behaviors and
values that will assist leaders in avoiding decision
paralysis resulting from big data challenges.
Leadership Models
The modern decision-making environment is historically unique. At no other time has the military
commander needed to navigate such a wealth of
information—and disinformation—to come to a decision. Moreover, the pace at which information travels
to the public places greater scrutiny on these decisions. The novelty of big data challenges often leads
to calls for innovative, groundbreaking technological
solutions to help the commander manage the complexity of the information environment. Such calls,
while valid, must not overlook the need for ethical
leadership.
A discussion of ethical leadership for the information age requires reliance on timeless values, ones that
withstand the exploding information environment.
Chris Inglis, former Deputy Director of the NSA and
a retired U.S. Air Force Brigadier General, notes that
in dynamic, challenging, and fast-moving times like
the present, the danger is to conclude that exceptional
circumstances justify stretching or, indeed, departing
from the values and principles that define us. As put
by U.S. diplomat George Kennan, writing in 1946 on
the looming existential challenge of Soviet subversion,
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“the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with
this problem . . . is that we shall allow ourselves to
become like those with whom we are coping.”23 On
the contrary, Inglis reminds commanders that values
endure and should constitute the bedrock of ethical
leadership.24
A traditional values- or virtues-based approach to
leadership identifies the virtues that make one “excellent in character.”25 Thomas Aquinas, one of the leading classical authorities on virtue theory, identifies
temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude as the four
cardinal virtues. These virtues are cardinal because all
other values fall under these four categories:
In this way, they are called principal, being general, as
it were, in comparison with all the virtues. Thus, for
instance, any virtue that causes good in reason’s act of
consideration may be called prudence; every virtue that
causes the good of right and due in operations, called
justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions,
called temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the
mind against any passions whatever, called fortitude.26

Nevertheless, while these cardinal virtues encompass many other qualities that may be relevant to leadership in the information environment at any given
time, they are problematic as a practical framework
for ethical leadership in the sense that they provide
very unfocused descriptions of what “excellent character” should look like. John Knights’ “transpersonal
leadership” model, by contrast, identifies the specific
values most relevant to the military commander’s
responsibilities in the face of big data challenges. This
model, illustrated in figure 1, describes an evolutionary, multi-step process, the aim of which is to become
a “transpersonal leader,” meaning one that operates
while fully conscious of ethical values.
9

Source: LeaderShape.

Figure 1. “Transpersonal Leadership”
Development27
A further key element of this model is acquiring
and applying the behaviors necessary for putting
the values identified to good use by applying a full
understanding of how those values influence or affect
subordinates in order to enhance leadership.28 The distinction between ethical leadership and underpinning
ethical behaviors is outlined in the following quotes.
Ethical Leadership as the process of influencing people
to act through principles and values and beliefs that
embrace what we have defined as ethical behaviour
[emphasis and italics in original].29
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Ethical Behaviour: Acting in a way that is consistent with
one’s own principles and values which are characterized
by honesty, fairness and equity in all interpersonal
activities, be they personal or professional. And by
respecting the dignity, diversity and rights of individuals
and groups of people [italics in original].30

The immediate relevance of this leadership model
to commanders’ interaction with the intelligence process and subsequent decision-making comes in the
initial steps shown in figure 1—specifically, the identification of the EI leadership styles and behaviors
necessary for dealing with big data’s challenges. This
identification, Knights believes, is the skill, facility, or
learned behavior that enables military commanders or
leaders in other occupations to examine the different
relationships for which they are responsible and then
to identify what leadership style is most appropriate
for that relationship.31
Consequently, these leadership capabilities inform
the behaviors that a leader must develop. Table 1
reflects a compilation of research that outlines six
basic leadership styles and their associated behaviors, or EI competencies. The list is derived primarily
from the work of Daniel Goleman, a U.S. psychologist
best known for raising awareness on the importance
of EI in leadership, and refined by Knights and other
authors.32
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Leadership Style

“Style in a
Phrase”

EI Competencies

Commanding

“Do what I tell
you.”

Achievement,
initiative, influence

Visionary

“Come with me.”

Inspirational
leadership, selfconfidence, change
catalyst, transparency

Affiliative

“People come
first.”

Empathy, conflict
management, building
bonds

Democratic

“What do you
think?”

Self-confidence,
transparency, inspirational leadership,
change catalyst

Pacesetting

“Do as I do now.”

Achievement,
initiative

Coaching

“What would you
do?”

Developing others,
empathy, selfawareness

Table 1. Goleman’s Six Leadership Styles
at a Glance33
These leadership styles provide a framework for
addressing the phases of the intelligence process in
which big data challenges have the greatest impact.
Analysis of the military commander’s role in each
phase can determine the optimal leadership style and
EI competencies necessary for planning and directing
intelligence. The analysis also leads to consideration
of the values and character assets that must be maintained and observed by the commander in order to
support and enable each leadership style.
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Ethical Leadership: An Intelligence
Cycle Case Study
The military commander’s relationship with intelligence provides a suitable case study for examining
big data challenges due to the information revolution’s complete transformation of how a commander
directs, receives, and acts on intelligence. This monograph adopts the U.S. Army’s definition of the intelligence process, which is:
a continuous process that directly supports the
operations process through understanding the
commander’s information requirements, analyzing
information from all sources, and conducting operations
to develop the situation. Intelligence is also a function
that facilitates situational understanding and supports
decision-making.34

As shown in figure 2, the intelligence process consists of the following steps: plan and direct, collect,
produce, disseminate, analyze, and assess. This figure
also identifies the phases in which the three big data
challenges previously identified are assessed to have
the greatest impact. The following paragraphs will
explore how the military commander can provide ethical leadership in each of these phases.
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Figure 2. Big Data Challenges Impact in the
U.S. Army Intelligence Process35
CHALLENGE 1: DATA OVERLOAD
IN PLANNING AND DIRECTING
Data overload—in volume and variety—has its
greatest impact in the very first phase of the intelligence process. The plan and direct phase is critical
in developing the strategy for tackling the “Vacuum
Cleaner” collection problem previously mentioned.
According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 2-0,
the:
plan and direct step includes activities that identify key
information requirements for the commander, develop
the means for satisfying those requirements, and posture
the unit for transition to the next operation.36
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Within this process, ADP 2-0 asserts, the commander’s responsibility is to “provide guidance” and to
state “clear, concise commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIRs).”37 CCIRs “define those policy
issues or areas to which intelligence is expected to
make a contribution, as well as decisions about which
of these issues has priority over the others. It may also
mean specifying the collection of certain types of intelligence.”38 The commander’s responsibility to set priorities is paramount in the information environment,
as there are many priorities competing for limited
resources available to collect and process data.
Having identified the commander’s responsibility
in planning and directing intelligence, the question for
this monograph is what leadership approach best facilitates guiding and extracting maximum value from
the intelligence process. General McChrystal offers an
answer to this question in his leadership study, Team
of Teams: New Rules for Engagement in a Complex World.
The traditional image of military command is one
of a rigid hierarchy. McChrystal describes this commander as the “heroic leader,” the grand chessmaster
with the capability to direct every move. At the speed
of this technological era, however, the chessmaster can
no longer control all of the moving pieces.39 McChrystal writes:
One solution to information overload is to increase a
leader’s access to information, fitting him with two
smartphones, multiple computer screens and weekend
updates. But the leader’s access to information is not the
problem. We can work harder, but how much can we
actually take in? Attention studies have shown that most
people can thoughtfully consider only one thing at a time,
and that multitasking dramatically degrades our ability
to accomplish tasks requiring cognitive concentrations.
Given these limitations, the idea that a “heroic leader”

15

enabled with an uber-network of connectivity can
simultaneously control a thousand marionettes on as
many stages is unrealistic.40

Instead, McChrystal proposes that today’s leader
must be more like a “gardener.” As the Task Force
Commander in Iraq in 2004, McChrystal observed
that he needed to nurture his command to grow into
a “shared consciousness” that empowered autonomy
of action throughout the chain of command and was
unified under one vision.41
Recommended Leadership Style
McChrystal’s gardening philosophy of leadership
most closely identifies with the Goleman “coaching”
style. Coaches focus on developing others and building “capability in individuals that are consistent with
[an] organisation’s goals by helping them solve issues
and challenges through listening and asking open
questions.”42 The process requires continual dialogue
and, similarly, McChrystal developed a routine called
“thinking out loud” during the daily O&I briefing:
I adopted a practice I called “thinking out loud,” in
which I would summarize what I’d heard, describe how
I processed the information, outline my first thoughts
on what we should consider doing about it. It allowed
the entire command to follow (and correct where
appropriate) my logic trail, and to understand how I was
thinking. After I did that, in a pointed effort to reinforce
empowered execution, I would often ask the subordinate
to consider what action might be appropriate and tell me
what he or she planned to do.43

According to Goleman, however, this coaching style
is the most difficult to employ because it is timeconsuming.44 Indeed, McChrystal admits that the
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nurturing and gardening process requires selfdiscipline and, at times, is exhausting.45 The outcome,
however, is well worth the required time and discipline because it empowers the larger team to tackle
the challenges of the modern environment with the
same vision.
The coaching leadership style is critical to the plan
and direct phase of the intelligence process. While
commanders must continually communicate CCIRs
to the staff and IC, information and events move so
rapidly that the commander must also invest time in
helping the team share his or her thought process. This
shared vision allows the team, at all levels, to navigate
the massive volume of information with a unified purpose. This delegation and empowerment, guided by a
clear set of CCIRs, will provide the critical direction
necessary for the intelligence process.
Essential EI Competencies
As shown in table 1, the primary EI competencies
underlying the coaching style are identified as developing others, empathy, and self-awareness. Knights
defines the social competence of developing others as
a relational skill of “bolstering others’ abilities through
feedback and guidance.”46 McChrystal’s “thinking
out loud” process embodies this concept. Moreover,
McChrystal demonstrated empathy with those who
were responsible for processing and communicating
the intelligence gleaned from big data. Empathy is
“sensing others’ emotions, understanding their perspective, and taking active interest in their concerns.”47
According to Knights, most leaders would benefit
from greater empathy in their interactions. Echoing
this sentiment, McChrystal expressed his desire to
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serve as an “empathetic crafter of culture” and lived
this mission out during the daily O&I process.48
As they briefed me I tried to display rapt attention. At
the conclusion, I’d ask a question . . . I wanted to show
that I had listened and that their work mattered . . . For
a young member of the command, even if the brief had
been terrible, I would compliment the report. Others
would later offer them advice on how to improve—but
it didn’t need to come from me in front of thousands of
people. When we did it right, the analyst left the O&I
more confident about, committed to, and personally
invested in our effort. ‘Thank you’ became my most
important phrase, interest and enthusiasm my most
powerful behaviors.49

Finally, self-awareness requires the ability to read
“one’s own emotions and recognising their impact;
using ‘gut-sense’ to guide decisions.”50 McChrystal,
for example, noted that he needed to make a conscious
effort to control his emotions so that they would not be
interpreted incorrectly over the video teleconference.
Sarcasm or disinterest in this forum could have a serious, negative effect on the organization as a whole.51
Critical Values
Part of the shared consciousness that McChrystal described also requires a shared consciousness of
values and consideration of what sort of character the
commander should or must cultivate for leadership
in the information environment. This is an important question, as a commander’s ethical values must
undergird the emotional behaviors that the previous
passages have identified as necessary for command
of the planning and directing phase of the intelligence
process. When asked to comment on the values that a
military commander needs in order to make decisions
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in the face of uncertainty, Knights named truth and
honesty, as well as trustworthiness, as essential.52 This
echoes and confirms the conclusions of earlier studies
of the evolving nature of generalship compiled at the
beginning of the information era, noting or advising
an evolution to so-called “post-heroic” leadership.53
According to Goleman, the coaching process is
most successful when employees want to be coached.54
The commander’s virtues will play an important role
in this factor. McChrystal reminds leaders that honesty incurs respect.55 If subordinates have respect for
their leaders—and are confident in their truth and
honesty—they will be more receptive to their guidance
and direction. Honesty will also play an important role
in the commander’s emotional self-reflection, examining whether there are any personal poor emotional
behaviors that might detract from the commander’s
ability to develop a shared consciousness. Separately,
subordinates will also be more receptive to the coach
whose integrity is trustworthy. In planning and directing the intelligence process, for example, Inglis comments that the commander must understand the limits
and boundaries that law places on intelligence collection.56 Assured of the commander’s truthfulness, honesty, trustworthiness, and integrity, the commander’s
staff and the IC will be all the more willing to support
the CCIRs in the ultimate pursuit of the shared vision.
CHALLENGE 2: DISINFORMATION
IN ASSESSMENT
The commander’s responsibility in the face of the
disinformation environment is most evident in the
assessment phase of the intelligence process. According to ADP 2-0:

19

the assessment allows commanders, staffs, and
intelligence leaders to ensure intelligence synchronization
. . . Continuous assessment of the effects of each element
on the others, especially the overall effect of threat
actions on friendly operations, is essential to situational
understanding.57

As the staff and IC take the commander’s direction for
intelligence collection and analyze this collection, the
commander must participate in the assessment of this
information.
McChrystal suggests that commanders participate
by asking questions. He notes that briefings often provide incomplete accounts of the situation and that a
thoughtful question can expose this gap:
Early in 2005 my intelligence officer, then Colonel
(later Lieutenant General) Mike Flynn, taught me a
great technique. We were visiting a unit that boasted of
having more than 250 intelligence sources (Iraqi civilians
recruited to pass information to U.S. forces). I was deeply
impressed. Mike then asked a simple question: “Can you
describe your very best source? I’ll assume that all the
others are less valuable.” The unit admitted that the best
was new and unproven, and in an instant, it was clear
that their source network had little real substance.58

As demonstrated in the account of the Russian information campaign, disinformation in today’s modern
information environment poses a real threat. Commanders, therefore, have the responsibility to question
the veracity of intelligence analysis and thereby serve
as a strategic sounding board for the team as a whole
in the iterative assessment process. The definition of
ethical leadership in this difficult task, however, will
depend on how the commander chooses to lead and
which emotional competencies are employed.
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Recommended Leadership Style
Identifying disinformation in the information environment is truly a team task. The commander, as a
general rule, is not the expert in the room and therefore must rely on trusted and capable analysts and
advisers. For this task, the democratic style of leadership is most fitting. Discussion of a democratic style
of leadership at first perhaps seems counterintuitive
in the traditional discourse of the military chain of
command. In the assessment process, however, the
commander must leverage the expertise in the room.
Goleman describes the democratic style as one that
builds trust and commitment through getting people’s ideas and buy-in. Goleman theorized, “By letting
workers themselves have a say in decisions that affect
their goals and how they do their work, the democratic leader drives up flexibility and responsibility.”59
A democratic style of leadership multiplies the
commander’s ability to ask the right questions. With
a diverse panel of trusted advisers—to include intelligence analysts—the commander has a better chance
not only of identifying possible disinformation but
also the best responses if needed. The commander
must foster a safe, welcoming, and professional environment where both junior and senior staff members can raise concerns regarding the veracity of the
information.
Essential EI Competencies
A commander’s role in providing feedback and
questioning intelligence analysis, however, must be
combined with EI behaviors to be successful. More
specifically, the commander and his staff must cultivate a team mentality as they assess and question
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intelligence analysis. This process must not be perceived as combative or demeaning, as such behavior
would very rapidly degrade the trust that they have
worked so hard to build.
Research indicates that the primary EI competencies that comprise the democratic leadership style
are self-confidence, transparency, inspirational leadership, and change catalysis. To lead in a democratic
environment, the commander must first have “a sound
sense of one’s self-worth and capabilities.”60 This selfconfidence is required to navigate the inherent vulnerability of transparency. To facilitate a frank discussion
and build trust, the commander must also be transparent with the team concerning gaps in personal knowledge or lack of understanding. Having displayed this
transparency, the commander, in turn, can communicate to the intelligence team that he expects mutual
transparency as to the community’s confidence in the
validity of the information.
Most importantly, however, the commander
should emphasize that any questions or concerns
raised during the assessment phase are only part of
the iterative process to make the team better, and not
a direct criticism meant to discourage or discredit the
intelligence function. Advisers should follow suit with
the mentality that combating disinformation in the
environment will truly be a joint effort of many teams
toward the single vision of timely, accurate intelligence to the warfighter. This is inspirational leadership, asking team members to act beyond the ego for
the greater good.61 This inspirational leadership, however, may require a catalyst to produce a change in the
command’s culture. To foster a healthy, democratic
environment of ideas and buy-in, the commander
must lead the organization away from the “us versus

22

them” mentality that at times occurs between O&I, as
well as other parts of the staff. The commander should
discourage “finger pointing” from any side and create
an environment in which ideas and concerns can be
expressed freely from all ranks.
Critical Values
Which values are critical for the commander if his
team building and democratic leadership are going to
be a success? A democratic approach to military leadership requires a degree of humility on the part of the
commander, with the recognition that it is impossible
for a single leader to be equipped to navigate the information environment alone—let alone the disinformation environment. McChrystal agrees to the need for
this virtue in command, writing, “Although I recognized its necessity, the mental transition from heroic
leader to humble gardener was not a comfortable one
[italics added].”62
Additionally, the commander must demonstrate
fairness in building team collaboration. The perception of favoring one team over another could prove
detrimental to the collective team, risking devolution
into turf wars for influence. Turf wars only compartmentalize information, further risking the possibility
for disinformation to make its way undetected into
the factors informing command decision—which is,
after all, its primary objective. Instead, the commander
must communicate equally an appreciation for the
intelligence function as well as the operators who act
on this intelligence. Additionally, while this monograph focuses primarily on the commander’s roles
and responsibility in the intelligence process, fairness
requires that equal scrutiny be applied to all other
aspects of the decision-making cycle.
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CHALLENGE 3: PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF
COMMAND DECISION
Finally, we return once more to the primary
responsibility of the commander—decision in the face
of uncertainty. At the end of the intelligence process,
the commander generally must make a decision and
determine an appropriate course of action. Big data
and the technological revolution, as already noted,
have greatly increased public scrutiny as, at times,
command decision can be judged instantaneously.
While the commander may receive inputs from intelligence and advisers, the decision is the responsibility
of command alone. In other areas of the intelligence
process, the commander must empower subordinates
by coaching them to act with the command’s perspective as well as fostering a democratic environment
to promote accurate assessments in the face of disinformation. At the end of the day, however, the commander cannot delegate authority and is ultimately
accountable to public scrutiny of the outcome.
Recommended Leadership Style
The visionary leadership style will serve the
commander well in the decision-making process.
Visionary leaders provide a clear direction for their
followers. They say, “Come with me,” assuring the
team that they are taking the lead and that they have
a clear vision with defined standards.63 Additionally,
Goleman observes that visionary leadership has the
most positive effect on workplace climate, and is most
effective when an organization needs a new course.
While this monograph recommends other leadership
styles for the internal steps of the intelligence process,
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the leadership of the process as a whole—as well as
responsibility for the outcome of the process—requires
a visionary style.
Essential EI Competencies
It is important to note that the EI competencies for
visionary leadership are the same as those identified
for democratic leadership: inspirational leadership,
self-confidence, change catalysis, and transparency.
This is to be expected if the democratic leadership
style is the key supporting style to visionary leadership.64 The EI competencies, however, manifest themselves differently in the commander’s role of making
decisions in the face of public scrutiny. It is in this
phase of the intelligence process that the commander
most closely resembles McChrystal’s description of
the heroic leader, one who is self-confident and sure
of one’s capacity to lead. In this phase, the commander
must adopt a more strategic vision for inspirational
leadership. The vision now is not only to provide
accurate intelligence to a single operation but, rather,
to make the right decision for an entire campaign—
one that will be judged with scrutiny. The expectation
for complete transparency with the public now or in
the future may well reinforce the imperative to incorporate ethical considerations into command decision.
Finally, visionary leaders must promote change.65
At the crucial command decision phase, the commander takes ownership of the transformation that
will need to take place in the commander’s modern
role in the intelligence process. The visionary leader
is needed to ensure that the coaching and democratic
styles are having their desired effects against big
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data’s challenges. As McChrystal asserts, “we have to
begin leading differently.”66
Critical Values
When asked to advise military commanders on
making decisions in the face of greater public scrutiny, Inglis reminds commanders to hold themselves
accountable for the long term. He believes that commanders should not have a practiced ear for the nearterm outcome of events but, instead, consider how
their actions and values will be judged in hindsight.67
With this in mind, the commander must cultivate the
timeless character traits and self-determination values
of courage and will.68
In his concluding remarks, McChrystal supports the need for moral courage for the modern
commander:
As the world becomes more complex, the importance
of leaders will only increase. Even quantum leaps in
artificial intelligence are unlikely to provide the personal
will, moral courage, and compassion that good leaders
offer.69

The military commander must demonstrate courage
in the face of uncertainty and increased public scrutiny. Military commanders hold a grave responsibility
to navigate the complexities of the modern era; they
must also have the courage and willpower to make
the final decision. The commander must have confidence that the work devoted toward cultivating and
empowering the team—and the personal, conscious
values that undergird the team’s relationships—will
be the best effort for both his Service and his country
as a whole in meeting big data’s challenges.
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CONCLUSION
The qualities required for successful leadership at
a command level are developing rapidly under pressure from omnipresent and overwhelming information inputs. However, these same pressures require
different leadership approaches and styles at different
stages of responding to them. The common factor is
that ethical leadership is essential to command decision in the big data environment. While technological
solutions for managing data overload and disinformation will remain relevant, a purely technological
approach is inadequate for equipping the military
commander for decision-making in the face of uncertainty. The commander must instead invest in and
intentionally develop a virtuous character in order to
succeed in the various and diverse leadership roles he
must play in the intelligence process.
This monograph first introduced the discussion of
virtues with Aquinas’ cardinal virtues of temperance,
justice, prudence, and fortitude. These virtues are
all-encompassing and provide a framework within
which specific leadership approaches to different
parts of the intelligence process can be refined. Synthesis and application of Goleman’s leadership styles,
Knights’ “transpersonal leadership,” and McChrystal’s observations of application can build on earlier
studies of the developing nature of leadership to provide specific pointers for achieving the best possible
leadership outcomes from a command in the information age.
On this basis, this monograph has proposed a
more concrete application of these cardinal values
found in the EI qualities that are required for a tailored leadership to meet different challenges of the
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information environment. Temperance manifests in
the humility the commander must exhibit in his role
in the intelligence process—the ability to curb the passions of pride and ego. Justice resonates in the fairness
and integrity that a commander must exhibit in cultivating the democratic environment for new ideas and
analytic rigor. Prudence is required if the commander
is to establish honesty and trustworthiness, the essential building blocks of a team that can tackle big data’s
challenges. Finally, the commander must have courage in taking responsibility for the final decision in the
face of public scrutiny.
However, values on their own will not transform an organization if they are not accompanied by
the appropriate corresponding behaviors. If a leader
cannot successfully connect with subordinates on
an empathetic level, then the leader’s values will not
translate to organizational values that empower subordinates with the unified direction that is essential in
addressing the information era’s key challenges.
It is important to remember that ethical leadership
requires commanders to adopt the behaviors and leadership styles that are most appropriate for the relationship at hand. This monograph examined the military
commander’s leadership roles within the intelligence
process, as big data has arguably had the greatest
impact on this dynamic. In the planning and directing phase, the military commander must adopt the
role of a coach, empowering autonomy that is guided
by a shared vision. In the assessment phase, the commander is best served by a democratic approach, which
fosters an atmosphere in which subordinates can challenge analyses to identify possible disinformation.
Finally, command decision requires visionary leadership. Leaders can never delegate the responsibility for
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making decisions in the face of uncertainty and uncertainty will always remain a factor in command decision. Commanders must be confident in their teams,
processes, and enduring values to meet the challenges
of the big data environment—and they must earn this
confidence for themselves in return.
While empathy was introduced briefly as critical
to the coaching leadership style, an additional note is
warranted. In an interview conducted for this monograph, Knights argued firmly that most people serving
in the military would benefit from displaying greater
empathy. Empathy is arguably the foundation of ethical behavior and, consequently, of ethical leadership,
as it helps the military commander understand the
perspectives of others and adjust behaviors accordingly.70 The ability to listen and observe situations from
other perspectives is a key skill in adopting the “gardening” approach identified by McChrystal as a practical implementation of the leadership styles proposed
by Knights and Goleman. As such, when considering
self-development, it would serve commanders well
to pay special attention to the development of this EI
competency. See table 2 for a summary of the leadership styles, EI competencies, and values of each intelligence phase.
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Intelligence
Phase

Recommended
Leadership Style

Necessary EI
Competencies

Critical Values

Coaching

Developing
others,
empathy,
self-awareness

Truth and honesty,
trustworthiness,
integrity

Democratic

Self-confidence,
transparency, inspirational leadership, change
catalyst

Humility, fairness

Visionary

Inspirational
leadership,
self-confidence,
change catalyst,
transparency

Courage, drive

Planning and
Direction

Assessment

Decision

Table 2. Summary of Key Takeaways
WAY AHEAD
This monograph has identified a range of competencies and qualities that are beneficial to or essential
for successful decision-making in the era of information overload. However, these are not qualities that
commanders can be expected to acquire by osmosis
once they reach a certain grade, and neither can the
qualities be inculcated by staff courses. A key feature
of the values-based behaviors described, especially
those based on empathy for subordinates, is that it is
hard for the individual who wishes to develop these
behaviors to assess them since their effects are felt
almost exclusively by subordinates.
John Knights’ recommendation for addressing this
challenge is the development of a confidential process
of 360-degree assessment throughout a military career
to assist future leaders in raising their consciousness
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of shortcomings through greater awareness of their
behaviors and, in particular, how subordinates would
change these behaviors, given the opportunity.71
Knights’ own specification for how a process like
this might be introduced is ambitious, and may not be
compatible with established norms in the U.S. Army:
It is critical that the assessment measures behaviours
not skills, that it promotes honesty and therefore is
confidential to the individual (it does not go in the
Human Resources file!) and that the inputs (apart from
the line manager) are anonymous. . . . candidates should
be encouraged to share the findings and in particular they
must be willing to discuss with their raters the one or two
key development areas they have chosen to focus on to
get their input on how to improve and then regularly
check on how they are doing.72

There can be little doubt that the introduction of
an effective and candid system of 360-degree assessment would be highly effective in reducing instances
of damaging and toxic leadership that go unchecked
under current reporting arrangements.73
These assessment processes would be most effective if incorporated into standard military professional
development programs throughout an officer’s career.
A junior officer, for example, could take the initial
assessments early in his or her career to gain an initial
baseline of both leadership behaviors and values. The
officer should then be equipped with exercises to hone
new leadership behaviors and raise values to a higher
level of consciousness; exercises such as this scenariobased approach would serve officers well in helping
them prepare for the leadership styles and values
most relevant to today’s challenges at a senior level.
Finally, a senior mentor assigned to each officer would
be instrumental in monitoring progress and could
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serve as a third party to solicit 360-degree feedback as
the officer progresses in his or her career. This should
be an iterative process incorporated into professional
military development programs to ensure officers are
growing toward effective and multidimensional leadership as they become more senior in rank.
The “multidimensional” element of leadership
arises because of the need for military commanders to
master a wide range of EI competencies and virtues. It
can be argued that truly skilled leaders hold competencies in all six leadership styles, and apply practiced
judgment to determine which styles are most appropriate for their roles and responsibilities at any given
moment. A leader, for example, cannot always be a
humble coach or a manager of democratic discourse.
This monograph has focused on the commander’s relationship with the intelligence cycle as the
clearest example of new demands placed on command decision-making in the information era. However, the response proposed—developing a range of
leadership styles appropriate to specific situations—
applies across all areas where the commander wishes
to render his command more effective by developing
and empowering a team. In all cases, this will require
ethical leadership consisting of values and appropriate behaviors to leverage a stronger, more cooperative, more responsive, and more interactive team,
which will prove foundational for the team’s success.
Moreover, confidence in the team’s capabilities and
mandate in the face of contemporary challenges will
strengthen the commander’s courage to accept responsibility for the final decision.
Leadership in the modern age is no easy task.
Leaders face a new range of challenges in addition
to the eternal responsibilities of command. Ethical
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leadership, however, will help ensure that the commander’s decisions withstand the test of time because
they are based on enduring values and behaviors and
can contribute to building a team that is empowered
to transcend the complexities of the modern age.
SPECIFIC POLICY RECOMMENDATION:
The U.S. Army should incorporate a 360-degree
feedback process into its Professional Military Education (PME) program in the following manner.
Recommendation 1
Newly commissioned officers should take a 360degree feedback assessment to establish a baseline
awareness of strengths and weaknesses in behaviors
and values.
Recommendation 2
Upon arrival to a new post, every officer should
be assigned a professional mentor (who is at least one
grade above). This mentor should not be a member of
the same unit.
• This senior mentor will be responsible for facilitating 360-degree feedback for the officer at the
midpoint of the assignment. This will serve as
an informal climate survey tailored to the leadership style of the officer in question.
• This senior mentor will be responsible for discussing the results of the feedback with the
officer, identifying areas for improvement in
leadership styles, EI competencies, and critical
values.
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Recommendation 3
Members should keep and track the results of their
360-degree feedback throughout their careers.
Recommendation 4
Discussion of the 360-degree process should be
incorporated into official PME training. Scenarios
should challenge students to identify appropriate
leadership styles; EI capabilities; and, most importantly, the values which underlie the decisions that
they might face.
ENDNOTES
1. Edgar F. Puryear, American Generalship: Character Is Everything: The Art of Command, New York: Ballantine Books, 2003,
p. 44.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter
Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1984, p. 101.
3. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought,
3d ed., London, UK: Routledge, 2001, p. 243.
4. Ibid., p. 216.
5. Michael Patrick Lynch, The Internet of Us: Knowing More
and Understanding Less in the Age of Big Data, New York: Liveright
Publishing Corporation, 2016, p. 8.
6. “The Four V’s of Big Data,” IBM Big Data & Analytics Hub,
Infographics, n.d., available from http://www.ibmbigdatahub.com/
infographic/four-vs-big-data.
7. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data:
A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think,
New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013, p. 9.

34

8. Ibid., p. 8.
9. “Big Data: What it is and why it matters,” SAS, n.d., available from https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/big-data/what-is-bigdata.html, accessed July 26, 2017.
10. For a recent overview, see Bernard Marr, Big Data in Practice: How 45 Successful Companies Used Big Data Analytics to Deliver
Extraordinary Results, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2016.
11. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 6th
ed., Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2015, p. 92.
12. Ibid., p. 94.
13. Puryear, p. 45.
14. “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office,
July 22, 2004, p. 400, available from http://govinfo.library.unt.
edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.
15. Clausewitz, p. 117.
16. “Analysis of Russia’s Information Campaign against
Ukraine,” Riga, Latvia: Strategic Communications Centre of
Excellence, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2015, p. 13, available from https://www.stratcomcoe.org/download/file/fid/77757.
17. Keir Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West:
Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power, London,
UK: Chatham House, March 21, 2016, pp. 36, 44-46.
18. Ibid., p. 31.
19. Clausewitz, p. 89.
20. John Mark Mattox, “The Clausewitzian Trinity in the
Information Age: A Just War Approach,” Journal of Military Ethics,
Vol. 7, No. 3, 2008, p. 202, available from https://www.academia.

35

edu/1384800/The_Clausewitzian_Trinity_in_the_Information_
Age_A_Just_War_Approach.
21. Ibid., p. 206.
22. Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail—But Some Don’t, New York: Penguin Press, 2012, p. 9.
23. Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall [“Long
Telegram”], February 22, 1946, Harry S. Truman Administration
File, Elsey Papers, available from http://www.trumanlibrary.org/
whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/6-6.pdf.
24. Chris Inglis, telephone interview, August 17, 2017.
25. Hugh LaFollette, ed., Ethics in Practice, 3d ed., Blackwell
Publishing, 2007, pp. 47-48.
26. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, Vol. II, Fathers
of the English Dominican Province, trans., Chicago, IL: William
Benton, 1980, pp. 55-56.
27. Image reproduced from John Knights, Danielle Grant, and
Greg Young, eds., Leading Beyond the Ego: Becoming a Transpersonal
Leader, Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2018, p. 9.
28. John Knights, interview, Skype, July 31, 2017.
29. John Knights, “How to Develop Ethical Leaders,” Transpersonal Leadership Series, White Paper 1, Oxford, UK: Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group, 2016, p. 4.
30. Ibid., p. 3.
31. Knights, interview, 2017.
32. Knights, Grant, and Young, eds., ch. 8.
33. Daniel Goleman, “Leadership That Gets Results,” Harvard
Business Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, March-April 2000, p. 82; also see
Ibid.

36

34. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Intelligence,
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 2-0, Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, August 2012, p. 1, hereafter ADP 2-0.
35. Ibid., p. 8.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p. 2.
38. Lowenthal, pp. 70-71.
39. Stanley McChrystal, Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World, New York: Penguin Publishing Group,
2015, pp. 221-222.
40. Ibid., p. 223.
41. Ibid., p. 225.
42. Knights, Grant, and Young, eds., p. 82.
43. McChrystal, p. 229.
44. Goleman, p. 87.
45. McChrystal, p. 229.
46. John Knights, The Invisible Elephant & the Pyramid Treasure:
Tomorrow’s Leadership—the Transpersonal Journey, London, UK:
Tomorrow’s Company, 2012, p. 56.
47. Ibid.
48. McChrystal, p. 222.
49. Ibid., p. 229.
50. Knights, The Invisible Elephant, p. 56.
51. McChrystal, p. 228-229.
52. Knights, interview, 2017.

37

53. See for example Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology of
Military Incompetence, London, UK: Jonathan Cape Limited, 1976;
John Keegan, The Mask of Command, New York: Viking, 1987.
54. Goleman, p. 87.
55. McChrystal, p. 231.
56. Inglis, interview, 2017.
57. ADP 2-0, p. 9.
58. McChrystal, p. 230.
59. Goleman, p. 85.
60. Knights, The Invisible Elephant, p. 56.
61. Goleman, p. 80.
62. McChrystal, p. 225.
63. Goleman, p. 85.
64. Knights, Grant, and Young, eds., ch. 8.
65. “LEIPA: Leadership and Emotional Intelligence Performance Accelerator,” Oxfordshire, UK: LeaderShape, 2016,
available
from
http://www.leadershape.biz/phocadownload/
ls160210LEIPAForClientsFINAL.pdf.
66. McChrystal, p. 231.
67. Inglis, interview, 2017.
68. Knights, The Invisible Elephant, p. 36.
69. McChrystal, p. 232.
70. Knights, interview, 2017.
71. Knights, “How to Develop Ethical Leaders,” p. 10.
72. Knights, The Invisible Elephant, p. 26.

38

73. For detailed discussions of this issue, see: David Vergun,
“Toxic leaders decrease Soldiers’ effectiveness, experts say,”
Army.mil, October 19, 2015, available from https://www.army.mil/
article/157327/toxic_leaders_decrease_soldiers_effectiveness_experts_
say; Carl Forsling, “The Military Has A Toxic Leadership Problem,” Task & Purpose, August 23, 2017, available from https://
taskandpurpose.com/military-toxic-leadership-problem/;
Denise F.
Williams, “Toxic Leadership In The U.S. Army,” Strategy Research
Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 18,
2005, available from http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/ksil3.pdf.

39

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General John S. Kem
Commandant
∗∗∗∗∗
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
AND
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Steven K. Metz
Author
Mr. Keir Giles
Publications Assistant
Ms. Denise J. Kersting
∗∗∗∗∗
Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

This Publication

SSI Website

USAWC Website

